Towards an Economic Theory of the Church by Hull, Brooks B. & Bold, Frederick
5 
Towards an Economic Theory 
of the Church 
by 
Brooks B. Hull 
University of Michigan-Dearborn, and 
Frederick Bold 
Criterion, Inc., Irving, Texas, USA 
Introduction 
Religion is one of the most pervasive phenomena in the human experi-
ence. Since virtually all societies throughout history engage in religious 
activity, it is surprising that economists give religion only limited 
attention. While the economic literature on religion is not very broad, 
it is long, dating back at least to Adam Smith. Smith even anticipates 
the important theme in this article that the church can be treated as 
a firm: "The clergy of every established church constitute a great 
incorporation"[l, p. 207]. Another important branch of scholarship, of 
which works by Tawney[2] and Weber[3] are major contributors, attempts 
to explain the effect of religious doctrine on the evolution of economic 
thought and behaviour, but fails to apply economic theory to religion itself. 
Recent economics research avoids the central issue of the nature of religion itself, 
and instead focuses on the effects of religion on various aspects of behaviour. Meng 
and Sentance[4] and Tomes[5] explore the impact of religion on individual earnings 
using US data. Also limiting themselves to US data, Ehrenberg[6] and Long and 
Settle [7] analyse factors influencing church attendance. In a humorous article, Dixit 
and Grossman[8] show how a limited number of positions in heaven result in rent-
dissipating activity. More recently, Posner[9] uses economic analysis of the law 
to predict its effect on religion in the United States. 
Economics offers an appealing apparatus with which to analyse the church and 
religion: the theory of the firm. The theory's potential insights in analysing the 
church have been acknowledged by other disciplines. Stark and Bainbridge[lO], for 
example, use an "entrepreneur model" as one method of explaining the formation 
of sects and the behaviour of their founders. 
The notion that the church can be viewed as a firm points toward two directions 
for enquiry. The first, the subject of the next section, concerns the intrinsic nature 
of the church. Here, we assert that the church serves the unintentional but essential 
function of reducing transactions costs primarily by enforcing a system of property 
rights. 
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The second direction for enquiry is to apply standard neoclassical theory of 
the firm to the church. We suggest that the church produces four sets of products 
which serve the combined functions of helping to enforce property rights and 
earning revenue for the church." We then test implications of the model using 
cultures from the Human Relations Area Files. 
The Nature of the Church 
Given the regularity with which churches exist and endure in human societies 
despite the great variety in religious doctrine, it appears that churches and religions 
playa role in society separate from the question of cosmological truth. Indeed, 
the survival of the church and religions is subject to the guidance of Adam Smith's 
invisible hand and by the process of natural selection outlined by Becker[ll, p. 
282J and Alchian[12J. Institutions such as the church - to paraphrase Smith -
may be guided by an invisible hand to promote an unintended end. 
The essential and unintended function of churches and religion, we contend, 
is the reduction of transaction costs. This is accomplished primarily through 
establishing and enforcing a system of property rights. Further, if situations in 
which changes in the relative costs of alternate property rights enforcement 
methods (or changes in relative benefits) are identified, we can test whether the 
implied change in enforcement method actually takes place. 
Throughout history, religions and churches have been a central force in creating 
and perpetuating rules of behaviour. Religions invariably include, as part of their 
doctrine guidelines, rules like the Ten Commandments. These are the foundation 
of a property rights system and thereby facilitate individual maximising behaviour. 
They also reduce transactions costs by supplying standard-form contracts. 
For example, religious rules commonly define the distribution of property and 
labour at marriage. Other religious standards define legal and illegal appropriation 
of property. More generally, religious rules reduce the cost of the whole universe 
of social interaction by providing a consistent set of behavioural standards to 
members of a culture, a notion recognised by authors, including Cheung[13J and 
Posner[14J. 
Another pervasive feature of religion is, of course, concern with matters beyond 
the eartWy vale. A plausible explanation of this aspect is that religion is a primitive 
science and serves a human need for explanation of matters beyond ordinary 
understanding. Although satisfaction of curiosity is clearly a valuable product, gods, 
heaven, and hell also represent an important innovation in property rights 
enforcement. 
Religions regulate behaviour by instilling the expectation that improper actions 
are met with divine retribution and that proper actions are rewarded. Of course, 
churches have used temporal methods of behaviour enforcement like incarceration, 
torture and execution, but, in general, it should be clear that religion provides 
a set of property rights enforcement instruments distinct from those used by secular 
authority. . 
Declines in the cost of secular enforc"ement should reduce the role of the church 
in property rights enforcement. For example, the marginal cost of secular property 
rights enforcement is low in a country with a large standing army to deter alien 
armies and ensure domestic' tranquility. Henry VIII is reputed to have been an 
exceptional military and civil leader, exactly the requirements necessary to supplant 
the Pope's authority. North and Thomas[15] explore the importance of technological 
developments which alter the relative costs of non-religious methods of enforcement 
The relative advantage of secular enforcement increases as wealth increases. 
Increases in individual wealth mean there is more for secular authority to take 
away as punishment for breaking laws. Similarly, the loss of eternal life is relatively 
less important for a rich person than for a poor person. Also required is that 
individuals cannot take wealth with them at death. In religions where wealth is 
carried into death, religious authority maintains the threat of damnation in the 
face of increasing income. The strength of the Egyptian theocracy is an example. 
Property rights enforcement by religion is not without difficulty, however. Since 
property rights enforcement is a public good, the supplier is confronted with the 
problem of charging and collecting for services provided. We suggest that, in 
general, it is too difficult for the church (or secular authority) to charge directly 
for this product, so income must be earned in some other way (secular authority 
uses involuntary taxation). The church solicits donations and also markets non-
public goods and services. At least some of the income from these activities is 
used to support the costs of providing"property rights enforcement and other public 
goods. Because the church markets non-public goods and must maintain positive 
net revenue, the theory of the firm may be applied directly to the church. 
Churches and Wealth Maximisation 
The fundamental behavioural postulate of the theory of the firm is that firms 
maximise wealth. Economists have good reason to expect that the assumption 
of wealth maximisation leads to reliable explanations and predictions. For one, 
the continued survival of any institution requires it to face the possibility of 
bankruptcy. To continue to operate, an organisation must maintain earnings at least 
equal to opportunity cost. Organisations that survive over time are necessarily 
those that have been able to maintain non-negative net revenue. 
A possible objection here is that in societies with a single church, or a 
government-supported church, the absence of competition between churches 
means a church is not obliged to maximise. The response to this argument is 
that, although it may face no competition from existing churches, the church faces 
competition from secular organisations in at least some markets and faces the 
threat of entry by new religions. Further, both firms and churches compete for 
the same resources and are therefore forced to manage their activities efficiently. 
Wealth maximisation is consistent with church behaviour, but this alone does 
not account for the church's distinct and enduring characteristics. A more general 
notion of wealth maximisation is appropriate. In light of Stigler's survivorship 
principle[16], the durability of religion in human societies strongly suggests that 
churches provide valuable products that aid in the continued survival of the society 
itself. 
Church Outputs 
Firms tend to sell a particular set of products because doing so maximises profit 
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economies of scope, and gains from tied sales. Churches also provide a particular 
set of products, because doing so maximises net benefits. This product mix is 
determined primarily by the basic function of the church and religion - reduction 
of transaction costs - and by demand for complementary products. In this article, 
these products are grouped in four classes labelled temporal bliss, social goods, 
deferred perpetuity and altered fate. 
The last of these is only briefly mentioned here. Churches commonly offer 
methods to alter what otherwise might be considered uncontrollable events. 
Intercession, laying on of hands and some kinds of prayer are all designed to 
influence the future. In providing this product, the church uses techniques like 
those modelled in subsequent sections of the article. In addition, the church's 
ability to sell altered fate is affected by alternative sources, primarily scientific 
knowledge. 
Temporal Bliss 
Tempornl bliss is a set of products that bring happiness in this vale. These products 
are traded in other markets and include goods like fellowship and entertainment. 
The benefits to the church of providing these products are straightforward. Tempornl 
bliss provides a source of revenue, it helps expand church membership (in tum 
enhancing revenue), and it provides an appealing and effective vehicle for 
communicating church doctrine. 
Because it is only one of many possible producers of temporal bliss, the church 
has an incentive to create and enforce a monopoly. Churches engage in a number 
of activities that have the effect of monopoly maintenance. Churches from time 
to time proscribed dancing, alcohol, gambling, dating, movies, make-up and video 
games, all forms of entertainment available outside the church. In at least one 
case, a church successfully promotes an activity within the church and discourages 
the same activity outside it, even managing to obtain state enforcement: bingo 
gambling. To the extent that such restrictions are successful, the church maintains 
its position as sole producer of entertainment. 
As personal income increases and entertainment technology improves, entry 
by competing producers of temporal bliss becomes more likely. Entry of substitutes 
to church entertainment causes predictable changes in church behaviour. Churches 
n1ust increase quality or reduce the price of products they offer. They begin to 
advertise. Church buildings become more architecturally stylish. Services are 
offered at more convenient hours, take less time, and contain greater entertainment 
content. 
Social Goods 
The second class of church products are public goods and include social rules 
and some important group activities. This ~rticle addresses property rights 
enforcement, the most important and pervasive social good, but religions provide 
other public goods as well, examples being preservation of knowledge, some kinds 
of scientific research, education and dispute mediation. Two additional examples 
of church-supplied social goods are discussed in more detail here: income 
redistribution and health rules. 
9 
Church members are encouraged to engage in charitable activities directly or 
to donate money to support charitable activities organised by the church. One 
reason churches encourage this sort of income redistribution follows the central 
theme of this article. Income redistribution can be a cost-minimising method of 
protecting property rights, in this case by reducing the incentive for theft by those 
who are poor enough so that legal or moral prescriptions against theft are ineffective. 
Income redistribution can ameliorate this problem. The legal system is freed 
of the difficulty of prohibiting an activity to which some people have little alternative. 
Recipients of redistributed income are given a lower cost alternative to theft and 
suppliers of redistributed income (potential crime victims) benefit both from the 
lower cost of coercive property rights protection and from a lower variance in 
income. 
If suppliers of income are averse to risk, income redistribution acts like insurance. 
As with ordinary insurance, the insured are willing to allow insurance companies 
(in this case the church) to appropriate some share of donated funds. The church 
enhances its financial position to the extent it retains these funds. 
Another form of church-provided insurance occurs because income redistribution 
reduces the variance in individual income due to unforeseen misfortune like crop 
failure and disease and, to some extent, foreseen events like relative poverty in 
old age. Once again, the insured are willing to allow the church to appropriate 
a share of donated funds. 
A second example of a social good provided by the church is the common 
imposition of various rules of cleanliness, medical treatment, food preparation and 
sanitation. The benefit to society of 'such rules is obvious. All members of a society 
gain by engaging in activities that reduce the possibility of the spread of disease. 
Kosher food rules are an excellent example of church rules whose effect is arguably 
to assure proper nutrition and reduce the spead of disease. One implication here 
is that, ceteris paribus, regions with greater population density or greater tendency 
to support disease should have churches with more extensive health rules than 
other regions. 
The preceding discussion describes important products produced by religions 
but does not explain what advantages the church has over government or ordinary 
private markets in providing the products. As mentioned, the social goods described 
here are public goods. For example, an individual engaging in good health practice 
is directly better off because of the reduced probability of disease, but all other 
members of the community also benefit since the given individual is less likely 
to spread disease to them. 
In private markets, public goods production faces obstacles not found in the 
production of other goods. Producers have difficulty appropriating the value of 
the goods to others and so are less inclined to produce them. However, in some 
situations, the church possesses characteristics that give it a comparative advantage 
in encouraging production of certain public goods. 
As Posner[14] shows, members of very small communities recognise the social 
costs of disease and poverty and are more inclined to act to reduce them. These 
cultures rely on extended family groups and practise forms of communal behaviour 
in which wealth sharing is an explicit part of the organisation. Here organised religion 
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In larger communities, people are less likely to recognise the social cost of 
individual misbehaviour and are less likely to behave properly since anyone person's 
gain from proper behaviour is so much smaller than the social gain. Comn1unity 
size is large enough for interaction to take place outside family groups but interaction 
is not extensive enough to include personal contact with all community members. 
Here, religious requirements assure provision of valuable social goods, and these 
cultures should possess the strongest organised religions. Homans[17] shows the 
Medieval Catholic Church's role in enforcing appropriate behaviour in larger 
communities. Davies [18] does the same for the Mormon church. 
By similar reasoning, organised religion is relatively less effective in industrial 
states. Here, the power of the central government to enforce property rights, 
transfer income and assure other proper behaviour eclipses the church's abilities. 
Given that it has a comparative advantage in encouraging particular social 
behaviour in some societies, by what methods does the church enforce its wishes? 
In addition to methods available to temporal authority, religions have two 
enforcement tools: the threat of social ostracism and the threat of punishment 
after death. 
An implication of the above is that cultures that rely heavily on chtirch enforcement 
of property rights should include both heaven and hell as part of their doctrine. 
These two extremes represent the maximum potential reward for good behaviour. 
In other research, Hull[19] shows how Roman Catholic Church doctrine on heaven, 
hell and purgatory changed in the High Middle Ages in a manner implied here. 
In cultures with state' enforcement of property rights, the threat of hell to 
encourage particular behaviour is relatively less important. In these cultures, 
therefore, religions are more likely to assert there is no hell and that heaven is 
achieved automatically or is preordained. 
Generally, firms prosper by offering products that are valuable to consumers. 
Hell is not valued by consumers (by definition). Its use, however, does increase 
church revenue and serves a valuable function to society. To the extent that hell 
enforces appropriate behaviour, it assures both the society's and the church's 
prosperity and viability. 
De/erred Perpetuity 
The third class of products offered by the church is a special form of a deferred 
perpetuity: blissful eternal life after death. A desirable external life is a common 
feature of religions. This product has one essential aspect in common with other 
products - it is available for a price. In some cases, like the common payment 
for indulgence at one time in the Roman Catholic Church, direct money payment 
to obtain heaven (more quickly) was used. However, direct payment for a desirable 
versus an undesirable eternal life is by no means the dominant feature of religious 
teaching. M'ore often heaven is acquired by adoptmg certain beliefs or by engaging 
in certain actions. 
Following one theme of this article, a church's choice for heaven's price is.in 
general that 'which maximises net benefits and addresses potential competition 
from other organisations. To the extent that people modify their behaviour, the 
property rights system is protected. When the church does extract money payments 
for heaven, non-revenue producing functions can be subsidised. 
11 
From the standpoint of economic theory, the product eternal life is particularly 
interesting because it is a credence good. The term credence good was coined 
by Darby and Karni[20] to label goods that have characteristics that cannot be 
determined either before or after purchase. Goods with credence attributes are 
a sub-group of the search goods introduced by Nelson[21]. 
The sale of credence goods presents interesting problems. Since a good's 
characteristics cannot be determined before or after purchase, a buyer must rely 
on the seller or a third party expert to provide information about the good. 
Unfortunately, sellers of credence goods have incentives to cheat consumers by 
overstating the product's merits (and so raise its price). Further, information from 
a third party expert is also a credence good. 
Buyers and honest sellers of credence goods gain if honest sellers can somehow 
assure their honesty. In the case of external life, the church may not be able to 
prove the existence of life after death, however, it can assure consumers that priests 
sincerely believe in life after death and believe that certain steps must be taken 
to achieve it. 
As a first step in assuring priestly sincerity, the church can reduce the potential 
personal gains to priests from the sale of eternal life. If successful, priests will 
be disinclined to misrepresent doctrine and exploit believers. For example, priestly 
vows of poverty and low fixed priestly pay scales help assure church honesty. 
Similarly, priests are often allowed to use but not own church facilities and housing. 
The common requirement of priestly celibacy also encourages honesty by priests 
since celibate priests cannot pass wealth to heirs. Interestingly, celibacy has not 
always been a requirement of Roman Catholic priests but was adopted in 1215 
AD in part as a response to priestly abuses. 
Protestant churches did not enforce celibacy. When formed, these churches 
had no store of valuable assets to lose and faced competition for priests from the 
existing church and other newly formed churches. In addition, the Protestant 
churches had little to offer potential priests and so chose to attract them by relaxing 
the celibacy requirement. 
The activities of church members also reduce the incentive by priests to 
misrepresent doctrine. When they engage in volunteer activities or other good 
deeds, members are transferring assets in a form that cannot be misappropriated 
by the church. This practice helps assure church and priestly honesty and makes 
participants and recipients better off, even though cash payments might appear 
to be a more efficient method. 
Even church architecture can help guarantee church integrity in selling heaven. 
A cathedral is a sheltered location for services and a dramatic advertisement, 
but the ornate structure and unique symbols built inseparably into the struc-
ture also mean that the cathedral fits Klein and Leffler's description of non-
salvageable capital used to assure product quality[22]. This substantial long-
lived investment with little or no salvage value signals church members that the 
church has made a substantial long-term commitment to maintaining customers' 
satisfaction. Should it fail to serve members, the church forfeits the investment 





International As an implication, churches which do not rely on expert priests should be less 
Journal of Social likely to feature ornate cathedrals or other facilities. Consistent with this implication, 
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Empirical Results 
_1_2______ The model yields a number of implications, some of which are amenable to statistical 
analysis. The Human Relations Area Files (HRAF) provides a unique opportunity 
to test the model. It is a detailed index and system of cross-referencing 700 
categories of information from ethnographies written by anthropologists about more 
than 300 cultures. 
Some of this textual nlaterial has been coded by sociologists and anthropologists, 
the first important example being the Ethnographic Atlas[23]. Subsequent 
researchers have coded material for a subset of 186 cultures in the HRAF. The 
subset is labelled the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample and its cultures are chosen 
according to a variety of criteria including that all cultural types be represented, 
that territories not overlap and that relatively comprehensive information be 
available[24, 25]. 
Table I summarises a series of multinomial probit equations with variables from 
the HRAF that correspond to some of the implications of the theory. The 
independent variable Gods measures on a scale of one through three the degree 
to which high spiritual beings who created reality are active and supportive of 
human morality in the culture[23]. 
Hierarchy measures from one through four the levels of political jurisdiction 
above the local community. H-Square is the square of Hierarchy, and is included 
because the model predicts a concave relationship between Gods and Hierarchy. 
Crafts indicates the extent of specialised technical skills in the culture and is ranked 
from zero to four. These variables were coded by Murdock and Provost[26]. 
Sects indicates on a scale of one through four the number of sects and religions 
in the culture. The code does not account for similarity of religious doctrine in 
different religions. This variable was coded by the authors. 
Credit ranks on a scale of one through four the extent and efficiency of banking 
and credit in the economy[27]. The variable Temples equals one if the most 
impressive structure in the community is a temple, church, or other religious 
structure. Otherwise, the variable is zero. This variable was adapted from a measure 
coded by Murdock and Wilson[28]. 
The variable Hierarchy measures the general complexity of the society. The 
coefficients on the first two independent variables show that the power of religion 
increases and then decreases as a society becomes more complex. This is 
consistent with the model. The church is most influential in complex societies 
without a fully developed central government. 
Church influence and craft specialisation are also positively related. This is 
consistent with the model to the extent that Crafts indicates the degree of 
specialisation in priestly skills as well. The number of sects and religious influence 
are positively related. Sects tend to serve a variety of individual interests and 
so increase the power of the church. 
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EconomicEquation Hierarchy H-Square Crafts Sects Credit Temples 
Theory of 
(1) 1.46 -0.29 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.02 the Church. 
(3.24) (3.03) (2.10) (1.72) (1.68) (0.08) 
(2) 1.46 -0.29 0.20 0.21 0.21 
(3.24) (3.03) (2.11) (1.72) (1.69) -
(3) 1.37 -0.27 0.18 - 0.14 
(3.65) (3.36) (2.16) - (1.24) 
(4) 1.48 -0.28 0.20 
(4.03) (3.63) (2.54) 
Numbers in parentheses are the ratio of coefficients and asymptotic standard errors. These 
Table I. are distributed normally for "large" samples. Sample size is 128. Multinomial Probit 
Results with Gods 
To the extent that credit markets are efficient, the variance in available interest 
rates falls. Lenders demand lower average interest rates when such risk is reduced. 
Lower interest rates mean that the present value of heaven is greater as is the 
present cost of hell. The church has more influence in this case. 
The presence of cathedrals or temples as the most dominant community 
structure has no significant influence on church power in the sample. The measure 
itself is not without fault, as it only recognises the most dominant structure and 
does not measure the extent to which church structures are used as non-salvageable 
capital. 
Although the statistical results lend an encouraging degree of support' to the 
model, several caveats are in order. First, the variables do not always exactly 
correspond to measures in the theory, the case of impressive structures being 
a clear example. 
A second problem involves the coding process itself. Coders read texts about 
a culture and assign a number according to some prearranged scheme. Such a 
process is obviously subjective. Some researchers address this problem by 
employing multiple coders. . 
A final potential problem is that the Standard Cross-cultural Sample is not a 
random sample. As mentioned, cultures are chosen based on other criteria. This 
is a serious problem if the sample is biased in some way. For example, cultures 
are chosen because relatively complete data are available. This decision may exclude 
important classes of cultures not studied. Because of the emphasis of 
anthropological research, modem western industrial cultures may also be under-
represented. 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this article is to suggest that economics provides a fruitful vehicle 
for analysing religion and the church. We hypothesise that religions and churches 
serve the unintended function of reducing transactions costs. This is accomplished 
by establishing and enforcing a system of property rights. Property rights 
enforcement and other desired behaviour is encouraged by using the low-cost 
innovations of heaven and hell. 
~ 
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Church survival also requires maintaining non-negative wealth. The church 
directly sells some products and funds others by using donations, the latter 
especially to overcome the difficulties of supporting production of public goods. 
Churches provide a particular set of products in addition to property rights 
enforcement. The church provides entertainment and other forms of temporal 
bliss, facing competition from private markets. The church encourages good social 
behaviour (other than property rights enforcement) like wealth distribution and 
health standards. The church promises a deferred perpetuity in the form of eternal 
life and assures product quality by restricting its priesthood and employing non-
salvageable capital. 
Multinomial probit analysis of variables from the Standard Cross-cultural Sample 
of the Human Relations Area Files supports some of the model's implications. 
Church influence increases and then decreases as a society becomes more complex. 
An increase in the number of religious sects increases church influence. Church 
influence is positively related to skill specialisation and by implication to specialised 
priestly skills. Efficient credit markets reduce interest rates, increasing the value 
of heaven and the cost of hell. 
A first exploration always leaves undiscovered territory. This article is no 
exception. It presents an initial attempt to explain important features of the church 
and religion. It is also a first attempt to examine with economic theory the sort 
of cross-cultural data available in the Human Relations Area Files. Much work 
remains. 
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